untitled
  • Hey Webmasters! Get a free website with holiday themes - Get it NOW!
MournfulMelody.bravehost.com

Where Am I?

Where am I?

One may place one’s head inside a vehicle and say, “I am in the vehicle.” One may place one’s hand inside a vehicle and say, “I am in the vehicle.” Dichotomically and equally, one may place one’s head inside a home and say, “I am outside the home,” or may place one’s hand inside a home and say, “I am still outside the home.” This duality of perspective regarding precise location of ‘one’ seems to be an important factor legally, socially, philosophically and cosmically, in that legally it forms a basis of crimes and torts where it is important to define the position of the one in question, socially it must have ramifications on acceptable and unacceptable placement of substantial enough portions of the body to qualify as regards the ability to say where one is, philosophically it provides an interesting focus for research into what we are and where that thing that we are is, and cosmically it may in study illuminate our place in the universe.

Firstly, in order to discuss where one is, the question must be addressed, “What do we mean by ‘one’?” In this context it would seem that ‘one’ is a human, a person, a corporeal entity with the ability to think, reason and act, a being with rights and responsibilities in society. ‘One’ is the man on the street, the woman on the corner, the child playing on the swing. Yet this could equally be extended in terms of the usage of such terminology to encompass cats, dogs, lions, tigers and an unending list of animals and perhaps insects. ‘One’ is the indivisible, the individual, the unique, only, single being. The Greek “atmos” provides an excellent basis for the comprehension of such a concept. Something which cannot be divided, something that is self-contained and self-existing.

The question is put when one moves, “Does one’s mind take one’s body, or does one’s body take one’s mind?” It seems at first instance a simple question to answer: one’s body takes one’s mind because without the body, the mind would be stationary. Yet comparably would the body be motionless without the mind. It follows then, that if one cannot separate the body and mind without losing some vital aspect of ‘one’, one must be a combination of body and mind in equal portions – if in portions at all. It could perhaps be argued that one is fifty percent mind and fifty percent body in order to make the relationship mathematically equal, yet this fails to satisfy the problem posed by the loss of one of the ‘halves’ proposed. A mind without its body would not make it halfway, nor would the body without the mind. It must be accepted in light of this that the relationship is fuller than suggested by the previous theory, and therefore could be a relationship where the mind is of one hundred percent presence and importance, and the body also.

If it can be said that the two are one, the body and the mind, then surely they must accompany each other in their entirety. Yet in each moment that passes, one loses skin cells from one’s body, one loses brain cells (assuming that the mind is facilitated by the brain) from one’s mind, or memories. One may lose a leg in amputation, or a function in brain damage, yet one is still one, not half, not three-quarters, but one. How then can this be? Can one ever lose so much of one’s self, either body or mind, that one is not who one once was? Or is it perhaps that we change so much and so often that no-one is the person or animal is from moment to moment the same, while the concept in others’ minds of who we are remains the link from the present ‘one’ to the previous ‘one’. In this fluid capacity, one could more simply be understood to be a person or animal in motion through space and time – and through concept.

So ‘one’ has been appreciated as being the entity that others, and perhaps one’s self, may perceive. This view can be accepted fully, in a humanistic light. However, this fails to address the question of whether one is in, for instance, a vehicle when one’s head is within the vehicle, when one’s point of observation is in the vehicle, when the majority of the combination of the body and mind in a purely physical sense is inside the vehicle or when an extremity or a part of the body amounting to less than half the entire body volume or mass is placed within the extent of a vehicle.

To investigate this, one must gaze at the problem with sociological eyes. It has been noted that one may say that they are in a vehicle when their hand is in the vehicle, or that they are only in when a certain part or percentage of their being is within the vehicle. If this is the case, that differing views are purveyed, then surely with having acknowledged that ‘one’ is a conceptual phenomenon based on perception of observer and actor, one is in the vehicle when the majority of people agree that one is in it.

This democratic location-finding should be developed with cautious regard to flaws and misuse. Both actor and observer must be honest with themselves and others. If one believes that the being in question is outside the vehicle yet states that the being is within the vehicle, this makes little effect on the observer’s opinion because they have simply told a lie; their belief is still the same. If however another person is convinced by the first’s false statement, then surely that second person fully believes the fallacy. If this is the case, then it would only take a matter of moments for us to recognise that what we are terming ‘untrue’ has to become true if enough people agree. Clearly this is impossible, as the truth does not change for the sake of consensus. But who determines the truth? In the example, the truth was predetermined by the author before the imaginary characters decided that the being in question was inside the vehicle when in proposed fact it was outside. In reality, one may never assess the situation in this pre-emptive way and because of this, the democratic location-finding principle stands.

It has been considered that one is, as per the examples, in the vehicle when the smallest part of one has entered the space described. Once the first atom of the smallest finger of the longest arm has crossed the boundary of the limits of the vehicle, theorists of this opinion would indubitably argue that one is in the vehicle. Yet a issue arises that one is also, as could quickly be agreed, in the garage. Perhaps it is possible, as the car is in the garage, to be in both at the same time when inside the vehicle. However, if the vehicle is parked outside the garage but only so in a minute sense – for example, if the car is sideways to the garage entrance, clear of the garage itself by mere millimetres – and the ‘one’ in question is standing in the garage it is of course easy to say that the being is in the garage. If said being then extends one arm and inserts such through the open window of the vehicle, where are they?

Proponents of the idea of smallest parts equating to the whole would say of course one has entered the car and can be said to be in the car, but one is also in garage (and the two do not overlap). If one is the only, the single, the indivisible and individual, it is theoretically and conceptually impossible for one to be both in the garage and in the car without the car being in the garage. So where is the being? This reflects the concept of majorities, but this again fails to satisfy. Where would the majority lie? Would the head be more important than the arm, or the other way around? The very contemplation of this theory bears little weight in the entirety of the discussion.

It follows, then, that one may not be ‘one’, as this has been specifically excluded by the lines of argument that have been explored, which may be seen to be comprehensive. This paradox has but one solution: if one is not one, one must be something else. We may still continue to term this unknown concept as ‘one’ by virtue of common usage such as using ‘Hoover’ to mean ‘vacuum cleaner’, which although incorrect is standard and fully acceptable. So the final question is, “If one is not one, what is it?” The answer seems to be that we as beings are not ‘one’, we simply ‘are’.

Nathan Glover



Web Hosting · Blog · Guestbooks · Message Forums · Mailing Lists
Allwebco Web Templates · Build your own toolbar · Free Talking Character · Audio, Fonts, Clipart
powered by a free webtools company bravenet.com